International financial reporting standards and private firms’ access to bank loans by Balsmeier, Benjamin & Vanhaverbeke, Steven
  
MSI_1610 
 
International financial reporting standards 
and private firms’ access to bank loans 
Benjamin Balsmeier and Steven Vanhaverbeke 
 
 
  
International Financial Reporting Standards and 
Private Firms’ Access to Bank Loans  
 
Accepted for publication in European Accounting Review 
 
August 2016 
ABSTRACT: Prior research has focused on publicly listed firms when examining the 
economic consequences of adopting International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). This 
study extends the literature by examining the ability of private firms to attract bank loans 
through the use of IFRS. Based on firm-level data from 25 countries, we show that private firms 
that voluntarily use IFRS are associated with a higher propensity to attract debt from foreign 
banks. We find no such association when examining their relationships with domestic banks. 
Supplementary analyses show that the results are mainly driven by private firms operating in 
countries with strong regulatory enforcement. The findings suggest that, conditional on 
adequate enforcement, the use of IFRS provides useful information for foreign non-relationship 
banks. 
 
 
JEL Classifications:  G15; G30; M41 
Keywords:  International Financial Reporting Standards; Private Firms; 
Debt; Enforcement 
Data Availability: Data are publicly available 
 
Accepted by Luzi Hail 
 
Date of first submission: 18-Feb-2015 - Date of final acceptance: 17-Aug-2016 
 
 
Contact details: 
Benjamin Balsmeier 
Technical University Freiberg, Faculty of Economics, Chair for International Management and Corporate 
Strategy, Schlossplatz 1, 09599 Freiberg, Germany 
Tel: +49 3731 39 2081  
Email: Benjamin.Balsmeier@bwl.tu-freiberg.de 
Steven Vanhaverbeke 
KU Leuven, Department of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation 
Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium 
Tel: +32 16 325 735 
Email: Steven.Vanhaverbeke@kuleuven.be 
 
Acknowledgment 
Mathias Brauer, Liesbeth Bruynseels, Dirk Czarnitzki, Katrin Hussinger, Mark Roberts and Mathijs Van 
Peteghem provided helpful comments and suggestions, as did participants at a KU Leuven seminar, a 
ZEW seminar, and the MEIDE conference. We are especially grateful to the editor and the referee for 
their valuable guidance. 
 
Funding 
The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support of the Flemish Science Foundation. 
 
Correspondence address 
Steven Vanhaverbeke, KU Leuven, Naamsestraat 69, Leuven 3000, Belgium. Email: 
Steven.Vanhaverbeke@kuleuven.be
1 
1. Introduction 
Prior research has documented various debt market consequences of IFRS adoption by 
firms listed on public stock exchanges. While voluntary IFRS adoption would seem to be 
associated with positive effects for the public firms (Florou & Kosi, 2015; Kim, Tsui, & 
Cheong, 2011), recent research suggests that mandatory IFRS adoption has no positive effects 
on debt financing and, indeed, may exert a negative impact (Ball, Li, & Shivakumar, 2015; 
Chen, Chin, Wang, & Yao, 2015; Florou & Kosi, 2015). Compared to the extensive evidence 
in the literature concerning the effects of IFRS adoption on publicly listed firms, there has been 
relatively little research exploring the economic consequences of IFRS usage by private firms. 
This study examines how the voluntary usage of IFRS by private firms influences their 
ability to attract debt financing from domestic and foreign banks. 
Currently, in 90 percent of the 116 jurisdictions that require publicly listed firms to 
adopt IFRS, regulators also allow private firms to adopt IFRS (IASB, 2015).1 Private firms are 
typically smaller than publicly listed firms and have a rather concentrated ownership structure 
with different governance, management and compensation structures. These characteristics 
influence the costs and benefits of using IFRS, which, in turn, influences the incentives to create 
corresponding accounts. Hence, the use of IFRS by private firms may have a different impact 
on bank financing compared to effects found for listed firms.  
Agency costs from the separation of ownership and control play a minor role for private 
firms (Fama & Jensen, 1985). This reduces the pressure for transparency from investors (Ball 
& Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler, Hail, & Leuz, 2006). Private firms often respond to the 
specific needs of their stakeholders through private communication channels (Ball & 
                                                     
1 While representative data is scarce, other research studies document IFRS usage by private firms in different 
settings. Bassemir (2012) reports that 11% of private German firms voluntarily adopted IFRS in the period 1998-
2009. André, Walton, and Yang (2012) reports a percentage of 3.41% of private UK firms that used IFRS in 2009. 
26.6% of large private Portuguese firms used IFRS voluntarily in 2009 (Guerreiro, Rodrigues, & Craig, 2012).  
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Shivakumar, 2005). In addition, banks frequently have access to detailed private information, 
which reduces the demand for public financial statements (Chen, Hope, Li, & Wang, 2011). 
While the latter arguments suggest that the use of IFRS by private firms has no effect 
on their ability to attract debt financing, most arguments for positive as well as negative effects 
of IFRS usage by public firms also apply to private firms. Furthermore, the quality of private 
firms’ financial statements is no less important for non-relationship lenders. Information-based 
theories show that non-relationship (transactional) banks use their advanced capabilities to 
process ‘hard’ information when assessing a borrower’s credit quality regardless of whether a 
company’s stock is publicly traded (Berger & Udell, 2006). 
Regarding potential positive effects, IFRS usage may increase the quantity and quality 
of financial information provided to debt holders since IFRS demands the recognition of 
additional liabilities that are not required by most local accounting standards. Furthermore, the 
fair value orientation of IFRS promotes swift recognition of good and bad news, which 
improves the quality of information available to debt holders (Florou & Kosi, 2015). These 
arguments suggest that IFRS usage facilitates the assessment of a borrower’s creditworthiness 
and, thus, helps firms to attract debt financing. 
On the other hand, IFRS usage may have negative influences on debt financing. The 
greater flexibility inherent in IFRS allows more opportunistic earnings management, which is 
frequently used by private firms (Burgstahler et al., 2006). Other scholars argue that the 
emphasis on fair value accounting in IFRS decreases the verifiability and reliability of 
accounting measures, and this, in turn, reduces a potential lender’s perception of credit quality 
(Ball et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2015). Overall, it seems primarily an empirical question how 
IFRS usage influences the ability of private firms to attract debt financing. 
In the current analysis, we employ large-scale cross-country firm-level data from the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The data were collected in 25 
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European and Asian countries during 2004 and 2005. As in other regions of the world, private 
firms comprise the largest proportion of firms within this region.2  
The EBRD dataset has several unique features. First, it contains large-scale random 
samples of private firms where we can distinguish between private firms that use IFRS and 
private firms that rely solely on local accounting standards. Normally, this information is not 
publicly available.3 Second, it provides information on loans received from domestic banks and 
from foreign banks. Access to foreign banks is particularly relevant for private firms that 
operate in relatively small domestic financial markets (Berger, Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine, & 
Haubrich, 2004; Clarke, Cull, & Shirley, 2005). Third, the strength of the enforcement regimes 
varies significantly across the countries sampled, enabling us to address the role of 
enforceability of accounting standards. 
The econometric analysis reveals that voluntary IFRS users are associated with a greater 
propensity to receive loans from foreign banks to finance their new fixed investments, whereas 
no such association between IFRS usage and the propensity to receive loans from a domestic 
bank exists. This result is consistent with the notion that IFRS-based accounting is helpful for 
(foreign) non-relationship banks, whereas the marginal increase in information is rather low for 
(domestic) relationship-oriented banks. We note that all results are robust to controlling for 
various sources of self-selection that would normally confound empirical analyses, because 
private firms non-randomly chose to use IFRS. Since the matching techniques employed rely 
on observable selection criteria, we cannot and do not claim to report causal effects, though. 
                                                     
2 Out of the 25 million firms active in the European Union, 10,391 domestic firms are listed on a stock exchange 
in 2012. Similarly in the US, approximately 4500 domestic firms out of the 28 million are publicly listed (World 
Bank, 2015b; World Federation of Exchanges, 2015) 
3 Other databases that provide accounting data for private firms, such as Amadeus, solely contain data on the 
statutory financial statements of firms. Moreover, the Amadeus database does not differentiate between local 
GAAP and IFRS for most countries. Our dataset also includes firms that use IFRS from countries in which IFRS 
adoption was neither allowed nor required for official purposes. Our selection of countries is comparable to other 
studies that examine the voluntary adoption of IFRS, such as Cuijpers and Buijink (2005) and Daske, Hail, Leuz, 
and Verdi (2013). Private firms can either use IFRS to create a single set of financial statements if allowed by 
national regulators, or for dual reporting and reconsolidation purposes. 
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Our study makes three principal contributions to the literature. First, we provide large-
scale evidence on private firms’ IFRS usage and debt financing, complementing the extensive 
literature on public firms’ IFRS usage. Second, in differentiating between debt financing by 
domestic banks and foreign banks, our study underscores important but formerly neglected 
differences in the way IFRS usage contributes to private firms’ investments. Third, our results 
support previous findings that enforceability and credibility play an important role in the 
effectiveness of IFRS usage. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature 
on IFRS adoption. Section 3 introduces the empirical setup. Section 4 outlines our 
methodological approach and Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 covers robustness tests 
and the limitations of this study. Section 7 draws our conclusions. 
2. Review of the Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Prior Literature on IFRS Adoption and its Effects on Debt Financing 
Regulators, standard setters and accounting companies claim that IFRS adoption is 
effective in providing high quality information that reduce information asymmetries among 
capital lenders and borrowers. IFRS require more detailed disclosures, enhance the 
comparability of firms, facilitate better measurement and recognition of additional liabilities, 
and reduce the scope of earnings management (Chen et al., 2015; Florou & Kosi, 2015; Kim et 
al., 2011).4 Moreover, the use of fair value accounting accelerates the recognition of good and 
bad news (Ball et al., 2015; Florou & Kosi, 2015). 
Disclosing high quality financial information should increases a firm’s propensity to 
receive a loan and influences the price and non-price terms of debt contracts in favor of the 
borrower (Bharath, Sunder, & Sunder, 2008; Jimenez, Salas, & Saurina, 2006). However, 
                                                     
4 For example, prohibition of the ‘last in, first out’ (LIFO) rule for valuing a firm’s inventory. In our sample, 
countries where private firms employing local GAAP are permitted to use LIFO include Germany, Greece, 
Hungary and South Korea (Boadway, 1992). 
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empirical studies examining the relation between IFRS and debt financing report mixed 
evidence on publicly listed firms. 
Kim et al. (2011) find that voluntary IFRS adopters are associated with lower interest 
rates, less restrictive covenants, and larger loans with longer maturities. Supporting these 
results, Florou and Kosi (2015) report that the cost of bank loans decreases with voluntary IFRS 
adoption. Other studies focusing on mandatory IFRS adoption find that firms experience an 
increase in loan interest rates, an increase in the likelihood that a loan is collateralized, a 
reduction in loan maturity, and diminished use of accounting-based financial covenants (Chen 
et al., 2015). Since results are more pronounced where opportunistic earnings management is 
likelier to occur, verifiability and reliability of the financial statements may be reduced as a 
consequence of IFRS adoption. Complementary, mandatory IFRS adopters are more likely to 
issue public bonds instead of bank loans and to have lower bond yield spreads (Florou & Kosi, 
2015). Private loan spreads appear to be unaffected, though. In contrast to Chen et al. (2015), 
these results suggest that debt providers respond positively to the adoption of IFRS, but only 
when debt providers rely more on publicly available financial statements than private 
communication. Finally, Ball et al. (2015) examine the relation between mandatory IFRS 
adoption and accounting covenants in debt contracts. Consistent with the results of Chen et al. 
(2015), they find a significant decline in accounting covenants following the adoption of IFRS. 
Furthermore, accounting covenants are substituted by non-accounting covenants after the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS. Potential reasons for the reduction in accounting debt covenants 
include a reduction in contractibility, enhanced flexibility in selecting and applying accounting 
rules, increased rule-making uncertainty, and extended use of fair value accounting. IFRS 
adoption may therefore limit the use of accounting covenants in debt contracting. In sum, the 
literature indicates that IFRS adoption does not necessarily have a positive impact on bank debt 
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financing. Studies that focus on voluntary IFRS adopters find positive effects by and large, 
while studies that focus on mandatory IFRS adopters report no impact, or else a negative one.5 
2.2. Private Firms’ Costs and Benefits of Using IFRS 
The previously mentioned studies on IFRS adoption and debt financing focus on 
publicly listed firms. In principle, the main arguments also apply to private firms but some 
characteristics of private firms can cause differences in effects. Private firms typically have a 
concentrated ownership structure that reduces agency costs to a minimum, whilst publicly listed 
firms have a separation of ownership and control that generates substantial agency costs (Ball 
& Shivakumar, 2005). Since the potential to reduce agency costs through greater information 
disclosure is low for private firms, it can be inferred that the benefits of high quality financial 
reporting is low as well. 
Private firms are more likely to communicate through private channels in order to 
provide information to creditors and other stakeholders on their specific needs (Ball & 
Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006). This reduces the marginal increase in information 
that high-quality financial information based on IFRS can provide. In addition, key capital 
providers of private firms often supervise manager actively, affording them insider access to 
corporate information (Chen et al., 2011). It follows, therefore, that IFRS usage should have no 
effect on financing.6 
However, recent studies focusing on firms’ cost-benefit assessments of IFRS show that 
private firms voluntarily adopt IFRS when they have strong external financing needs (André et 
                                                     
5 Recent studies show that the improvement in reporting quality following IFRS adoption is confined to firms with 
strong incentives to increase their accounting quality (Christensen, Lee, Walker, & Zeng, 2015; Daske et al., 2013). 
IFRS itself may have no impact on the quality of financial statements, but it could be correlated with incentives to 
increase reporting quality. We discuss these incentives in greater detail in Section 4.2. 
6 In addition, the direct cost of implementing IFRS is known to be substantial. For example, adopting firms have 
to adjust their software and accounting systems, spend additional resources on (re-)training staff, and hire experts 
(accountants and/or auditors) who are familiar with IFRS. The disclosure requirements under IFRS can also 
increase information collection costs (Bassemir, 2012). 
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al., 2012; Bassemir, 2012).7 The benefits of high-quality financial reporting would appear to be 
especially significant when close relationships with lenders are lacking or costly to maintain. 
For example, when a firm is in need of external capital to finance new investments, it can either 
negotiate a loan deal with a known bank (relationship lender) or consider contracts with 
formerly unknown banks (non-relationship lenders). Close relationships can become costly if 
the lender seeks to exploit its informational advantage by charging a premium over its less well-
informed competitors (Rajan, 1992). Firms, therefore, have an incentive to decrease their 
dependency on a single relationship lender. However, potential lenders are at an informational 
disadvantage relative to relationship lenders and may surmise that the firm has a low 
creditworthiness (Detragiache, Garella, & Guiso, 2000). In such situations, high-quality 
financial reporting can mitigate adverse selection problems. 
 Moreover, some firms are unable to obtain additional finance from their relationship 
lender even when the lender believes the project to be profitable. This situation can occur when, 
for instance, banks are compelled to reduce their loan portfolio due to an unexpected loss of 
liquidity (Detragiache et al., 2000). Alternatively, new investments can be considered ineligible 
for loans if their risk profile exceeds a bank’s internal standards, or if they fail to meet regulatory 
requirements. In this situation, new investments can only be funded by loans from alternative 
lenders. IFRS usage increases the visibility of private firms to alternative lenders and reduces 
informational asymmetries. This can reduce the dependency of private firms on a single 
relationship lender and generate capital inflows over time. 
On the whole, voluntary IFRS usage is unlikely to impact relationship lenders who focus 
on non-public information, whilst non-relationship lenders who grant loans to more transparent 
                                                     
7  Other reasons why private firms adopt IFRS are high agency and information processing demands when 
ownership and control are separated, and greater internal information processing demands due to informational 
and organizational complexity (Bassemir, 2012). These incentives to use IFRS are discussed in greater detail in 
Section 4.2 where an overview of our control variables is provided. 
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firms may well offer debt contracts on better terms and conditions (Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 
2006; Berger & Udell, 2006). 
In our empirical analysis, we distinguish between loans received from domestic banks, 
which are typically relationship lenders, and loans received from foreign banks, which are 
typically non-relationship lenders. Information-based theories on relationship lending suggest 
that foreign banks tend to have fewer personal contacts and longer-distance associations with 
their borrowers, and rely more heavily on publicly available financial statements compared to 
domestic banks (Berger, Klapper, Peria, & Zaidi, 2008). Foreign banks are less able to process 
‘soft’ information from opaque firms located in foreign countries (Berger et al., 2008), and 
generally face an informational disadvantage relative to local investors (Brennan & Cao, 1997). 
Specific domestic sources of information, such as internal reports, are less useful and often 
unavailable to foreign lenders. In addition, foreign lenders are presumably more familiar with 
IFRS than local accounting standards, giving them an advantage in evaluating firm-specific 
risks when internationally comparable financial information is available (Kim et al., 2011). 
Therefore, we expect IFRS usage to have a positive effect on the propensity to receive a loan 
from a foreign bank.8 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1. Data Source 
The empirical analysis is based on the Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) that was conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction 
                                                     
8 In principle, one could expect a negative effect if the above-mentioned mechanisms for mandatory IFRS adoption 
apply. For example, Ball et al. (2015) show that IFRS usage reduces contractibility of the financial statements that 
firms provide to lenders. They demonstrate that banks use accounting covenants less often than non-accounting 
covenants in debt contracts when firms adopt IFRS. This can produce a negative effect on the ability to attract 
debt. However, it is unclear if this applies to loans that firms receive from foreign banks. Banks only use accounting 
covenants when they trust the information that firms provide. If foreign banks are more familiar with IFRS than 
foreign GAAP, it is less likely that contractibility will be reduced by using IFRS. A sensitivity analysis (Ball et 
al., 2015, p. 956) partially confirms this reasoning. In the case of international loan contracts, they report a positive, 
albeit insignificant, effect on debt covenants from the adoption of IFRS. This indicates that, for foreign banks, no 
reduction in contractibility due to IFRS is present. 
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and Development (EBRD) in partnership with the World Bank. We use the third wave of this 
survey, which was carried out between the last quarter of 2004 and first quarter of 2005. It 
comprises 14,107 enterprises from 34 European and Asian countries. The primary purpose of 
the survey was to identify the main constraints on the business activity of firms. This version is 
of particular relevance to our purposes as it includes information on private firms’ internal 
accounting practices. The identity of firms is not disclosed to ensure the greatest degree of 
survey participation, integrity and confidence in the quality of the data. 
We remove Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Serbia and Montenegro from the sample 
because private firms in these countries were required to adopt IFRS during the time period 
2004-2005.9 The small number of non-missing observations in these countries render an in-
depth study of mandatory IFRS adoption impossible. Next, we remove 1,202 firms that are 
active in the financial, public administration, health and social sectors, as well as 191 publicly 
listed firms and 796 state-owned firms. We then remove 7,066 firms with missing data on one 
of our outcome variables or control variables.10 Finally, we omit 339 firms that apply reporting 
standards other than IFRS or local GAAP. By following this procedure, we arrive at a final 
sample of 3,477 private firms from 25 countries.11 This sample is comparable to the original 
sample in terms of firm size, age and industry. In addition, we compare the data that is available 
in the BEEPS survey with the widely used Amadeus database. No notable differences exist in 
terms of industry composition. However, firms in our sample are slightly larger and older than 
firms in the Amadeus database because the initial sample was drawn from national registers of 
                                                     
9 1,036 firms drop out the sample due to this restriction. 
10 The original sample from the EBRD and World Bank include outliers. We have, therefore, removed from our 
main analysis one firm with more than 6000 employees. All results are robust to using truncated variables. 
11 Five countries are eliminated from the final sample because of missing values (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ireland, 
Spain and Uzbekistan). 
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firms with at least 2 employees. For further details, see the report on sampling and 
implementation of the BEEPS (EBRD, 2005).12 
3.2. Usage of IFRS 
The third wave of the BEEPS survey includes information on the accounting standards 
that each firm uses.13 We compare firms that only use local accounting standards with firms 
that use IFRS. The share of the latter group amounts to 12.08 percent in the sample. Table 1 
presents the sample breakdown by country and the details on country-specific rules regarding 
the adoption of IFRS by private firms. We report the date when private firms can effectively 
adopt IFRS for statutory purposes and indicate if they are allowed or required to adopt IFRS 
from that point onwards. 
It is important to note that not all countries under consideration explicitly allow private 
firms to adopt IFRS for statutory financial statements. Hence, not all private firms are allowed 
to use IFRS for their statutory financial statements which are disclosed to the public. However, 
these firms can still use IFRS for dual reporting, reconsolidation, or for other financial reports. 
These financial reports are regularly not publicly available, but they may be disclosed to 
stakeholders through private channels.14 As there is no obligation on private firms to publish 
these additional reports, survey data is one of the few ways to examine IFRS usage by private 
firms across multiple countries and jurisdictions. 
                                                     
12Prior literature has shown that private firms that adopt IFRS are likely to be larger and internationally active 
(André et al., 2012; Bassemir, 2012). In our matching estimation, we compare IFRS firms with local GAAP firms 
that are comparable in terms of size, age, industry, and other characteristics. Moreover, when we eliminate firms 
with less than 2 employees in the Amadeus database, the average number of employees is statistically the same as 
for the year 2004. Firms are still slightly older (a median difference of 1 year (average 1.7 years), which is 
explained by the fact that the BEEPS survey was partly carried out in 2005. 
13 Table 2 includes the exact phrasing of the question. 
14 This practice is also confirmed by Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes from the World Bank 
(2015a). They report that, in countries where national legislators neither require nor permit private firms to use 
IFRS to prepare their statutory financial statements, some private firms voluntarily compose complementary 
financial reports according to IFRS. These financial reports are generally not publicly available but are used for 
internal purposes or disclosed to third parties through private channels (World Bank, 2015a). 
11 
The IFRS variable included in the BEEPS survey combines five different types of IFRS 
usage: (1) firms that have either two separate sets of financial statements, one according to local 
GAAP (to satisfy regulatory requirements) and one according to IFRS, (2) firms that have one 
set of financial statements according to local GAAP and provide reconsolidation to IFRS, or 
vice versa, (3) firms that have one set of financial statements that complies with both IFRS and 
local GAAP by explicitly using accounting measurement options in local GAAP that accord 
with IFRS, and that provide supplementary disclosure required under IFRS, (4) if allowed by 
national regulators, a single set of financial statements that comply only with IFRS, or (5) firms 
that claim to have used IFRS without complying with all the standards. Therefore, these firms 
did not ‘adopt’ IFRS in the strict sense, since ‘adoption’ according to the IASB (see IFRS 1, 
para. 3) is ‘full compliance with IFRS in the preparation of financial statements’. However, 
private firms could still ‘use’ these standards to create (additional) financial reports. In 
consequence, our measure captures a variety of strategies that private firms deploy in relation 
to IFRS.15 All managers who confirmed using IFRS in the BEEPS survey have used it in one 
of these ways. However, we are unable to make an empirical distinction between these five 
different types of IFRS usage.16 
To validate the IFRS indicator, we compare the country rate of IFRS usage with other 
studies and databases. Sellhorn and Gornik-Tomaszewski (2006) report that 8% of unlisted 
firms in Germany used IFRS in 2004 by means of dual reporting. In our dataset, 10.33% of the 
unlisted German firms aver that they use IFRS. Using data from the German corporate register, 
Bassemir (2012) reports a slightly higher percentage of 11% over the period 1998-2009. In 
addition, we searched the widely used Amadeus database. Out of all non-financial private firms 
                                                     
15 Note that these patterns of IFRS usage are not unique to our context. Similar patterns are observed in studies 
that focus on listed firms (see e.g. the appendix in Daske et al., 2013).  
16 In the results and robustness sections, we further investigate differences between these heterogeneous IFRS 
users by using different subsamples where firms are more likely to have ‘adopted’ IFRS rather than merely ‘used’ 
it. 
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with consolidated financial statements in Amadeus, 9.66% of German firms adopted IFRS in 
2004.17 Hence, most firms in the BEEPS that claim they use IFRS are likely those that actually 
create financial reports based on IFRS.18 
<<<<<Insert Table 1 about here>>>>> 
3.3. Domestic and Foreign Loans 
Our main dependent variable is the percentage of new fixed investments that are 
financed by domestic loans and foreign loans. Alternatively, we use dummies that indicate 
whether a new fixed investment was financed by either a domestic or a foreign bank to examine 
the difference in the propensity to receive a domestic or a foreign loan. In robustness checks, 
we further investigate how IFRS usage is associated with the annual rate of interest, the value 
of collateral required, the duration of the loan, and the time period when the loan is received. 
4. Research design 
Empirical analysis must account for the fact that IFRS usage does not happen randomly. 
Expected benefits and costs of IFRS usage are related to varying incentives to increase 
accounting quality (Christensen et al., 2015; Daske et al., 2013). André et al. (2012) and 
Bassemir (2012) show that size, growth opportunities, internationalization and complexity are 
                                                     
17 The variable available in the Amadeus database on firms’ accounting standards does not differentiate between 
local GAAP and IFRS for most of the countries. For example, in some countries where IFRS has recently been 
required by private firms for statutory purposes (e.g. large firms in Bulgaria, or all firms in Macedonia and Bosnia 
Herzegovina) the database indicates that all firms use local GAAP whereas, for other countries that also require 
IFRS adoption, the database correctly specifies the use of IFRS for all private firms (e.g. Cyprus). Hence, only a 
few data providers in the Amadeus database distinguish between both standards. 
18 Moreover, in this version of the BEEPS, the EBRD made an effort to create a high quality measure that examines 
which accounting standards are used by private firms. A previous version of this survey has been used by Francis, 
Khurana, Martin, and Pereira (2008); however, the quality of the IFRS variable is questionable in this version (see 
Nobes (2010) for a detailed discussion). Due to the low quality of the responses on the IFRS question, the EBRD, 
in partnership with the World Bank, rephrased the question in the third edition of the BEEPS that we use. 
Additionally, the responses to the questions are now validated and checked. Observations that are, or appear to be, 
inaccurate or misleading are discarded. These quality checks are not reported in the first wave of the survey used 
by Francis et al. (2008). Moreover, the reports on sampling and implementation in the third wave of the BEEPS 
indicate the countries where respondents had difficulties answering certain questions (EBRD, 2005). For 22 
countries in our sample, no cases were reported where firms had trouble answering the IFRS question. Our results 
are robust to excluding Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Tajikistan where some respondents had difficulty 
answering the question. 
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important motives for private firms to increase their accounting quality and to adopt IFRS. 
Hence, in order to estimate the effect of IFRS usage on access to external finance, it is important 
to find a control group of firms that is comparable in terms of these firm characteristics. 
The econometric literature proposes different estimation techniques to correct for such 
selection biases, including difference-in-difference estimators, control function approaches, 
instrumental variable estimation and non-parametric matching (Heckman, Ichimura, & Todd, 
1997; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2008). We apply a non-parametric matching approach. The 
difference-in-difference method requires a panel data set where firms are observed before as 
well as after IFRS adoption. As our data is a cross-section and the change in use of IFRS is 
unobservable, we cannot apply this estimation technique. Other studies on the voluntary 
adoption of IFRS employ a two-stage control function approach (Kim et al., 2011). Lennox, 
Francis, and Wang (2011) show, in their review of 75 accounting papers, that many researchers 
tend to implement this technique in a mechanical way, without valid exclusion restrictions or 
theoretical justification. Selection models in previous accounting literature have typically used 
ROA, leverage, sales growth, percentage of foreign sales to total sales, percentage change in 
equity and debt financing, and cross listing as instruments in the first stage of calculating the 
propensity to apply IFRS (e.g., Kim et al., 2011). Some of these variables form exclusion 
restrictions in the second stage. The assumption that these instruments have no impact on the 
main dependent variable (e.g. debt loan spreads, larger loans or longer maturities) is, however, 
questionable. In the absence of valid instruments, which are notoriously scant, we refrain from 
using two-stage selection models. 
The remaining option is a non-parametric matching approach, which has a number of 
important advantages over parametric models (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2008). Most importantly 
for our purposes, non-parametric matching allows us to mitigate selection biases attributable to 
the most common selection criteria, including firm size, productivity, internationalization and 
14 
firm complexity, among others. A limitation of this approach is that we can only control for 
self-selection according to observable characteristics. We address this issue by employing an 
extensive set of matching criteria that arguably tackles the most prevalent forms of self-
selection into IFRS usage. Calculation of Rosenbaum Bounds show that unobservable factors 
need to have a very large effect if they are to render our main results invalid. 
4.1. Propensity Score Matching 
A non-parametric matching approach matches observations based on a distinguishing 
feature or treatment. The treatment in this study is the use of IFRS and the treatment effect is 
defined by: 
𝐸𝐸(𝜃𝜃1) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌1| S = 1) −  𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0| S = 1) (1) 
 Where S refers to the treated (use of IFRS; S = 1) and non-treated firms (use of only 
local GAAP; S = 0). 𝑌𝑌1 denotes the outcome variable of interest (i.e. bank loans to finance 
new fixed investments) when firms apply IFRS, while 𝑌𝑌0 is the potential outcome realized if 
the treatment group had not been treated. The difference between 𝑌𝑌1 and 𝑌𝑌0 is equal to the 
treatment effect 𝜃𝜃1.  Because 𝑌𝑌1 and 𝑌𝑌0  cannot be observed simultaneously for the same 
observation, we have to estimate the counterfactual situation. 
An unbiased estimation of the treatment effect 𝜃𝜃1  is based on the conditional 
independence assumption developed by Rubin (1977). The implication for our study is that a 
firm’s access to debt finance and the use of IFRS are independent from a set of exogenous 
characteristics 𝑋𝑋. Hence, the critical assumption is that we are able to control for the factors 
determining IFRS usage. If this assumption is satisfied, the following equation holds: 
𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0| S = 1,𝑋𝑋) =  𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0| S = 0,𝑋𝑋) (2) 
 We must, therefore, construct a control group that is comparable to the treated group in 
characteristics that influence the decision to use IFRS. The outcome of the control group can 
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then be used to estimate the counterfactual situation for firms that use IFRS. On the condition 
that there are no systematic differences between the treatment group and the control group, the 
treatment effect can be estimated as: 
𝐸𝐸(𝜃𝜃1) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌1| S = 1,𝑋𝑋)  −  𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌0| S = 0,𝑋𝑋) (3) 
Since the production and use of financial statements based on IFRS is determined by a 
multitude of factors, we apply the propensity score matching approach designed by Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983). We reduce multiple matching criteria (𝑋𝑋) to a single index by means of a 
probit model. The list of matching criteria (X) is described in detail in Section 4.2 and 
summarized in Table 2. The probit model estimates the propensity that a particular firm uses 
IFRS and the resulting propensity scores (𝑃𝑃�(𝑋𝑋)) are subsequently used as a single matching 
argument. To maintain consistency, we restrict the sample to common support, i.e. the control 
group contains at least one suitable candidate for each treated firm.19 
The following procedure determines the matched sample. First, we calculate the 
Euclidian distance (𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) between the estimated propensity score of a randomly selected treated 
firm (i) and each firm from the control group (j). 
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃�(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) −  𝑃𝑃�(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)∀ 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁0 (4) 
 Next, we impose the restriction that treated firms are only matched to non-treated firms 
from the same country, on the basis that each country has different regulations and specific 
differences between local GAAP and IFRS. We then construct the matched sample by matching 
control firms with the smallest distance to each IFRS-using firm on a one-to-one basis. This 
                                                     
19 We follow the econometric literature and restrict the sample to common support by deleting observations of 
treated firms with probabilities greater than the maximum and smaller than the minimum in the potential control 
group. 
16 
procedure is repeated for every firm that uses IFRS. If no potential control observation remains 
in the pool after applying the previous restrictions, firm i is removed from the analysis.20 
After we have identified the nearest neighbor for each treated firm, we can calculate the 
treatment effect (IFRS usage) by taking the mean difference of the dependent variable in 
question between the treated and non-treated firms: 
𝜃𝜃�1 =  1
𝑛𝑛1
(�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖1𝑁𝑁1
𝑖𝑖=1
−�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖
0
𝑁𝑁1
𝑖𝑖=1
) (5) 
With 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖0 being the counterfactual for i and 𝑛𝑛1 being the sample size of treated firms. 
4.2. Matching Criteria 
To address self-selection into IFRS usage, we match on all observable firm 
characteristics that influence the choice of using IFRS. A first important matching criterion is 
firm size, as measured by the number of fulltime employees in t-3.21 The internal and external 
demand for higher informational transparency increases with firm size. Larger firms are also 
expected to have better governance structures that facilitate external financing (Bassemir, 
2012). In addition, generating financial statements based on IFRS is costly, and large private 
firms can spread these costs over a large scale. In line with these arguments, we also match on 
firm age. Older firms are likely to have more stakeholders, which strengthens the need to 
increase their reporting transparency. 
<<<<<Insert Table 2 about here>>>>> 
                                                     
20 Note that we do not remove the selected control firm from the pool of potential controls, so that it can be used 
again. By applying this method, we obtain a control sample that has greater similarity to the treated group than a 
method using matching without replacement. For example, if replacement is not used, a number of treated firms 
would be matched with the second best option (or even a less good option), since the closest neighbor is already 
matched to another random treated firm. In our main results, less than 5% of cases in the control group are used 
more than twice, with eleven the maximum number of times one control observation is used. The only 
inconvenience of using the method with replacement is that one has to take into account the lack of independence 
between the treated firms that have the same control. In our main analysis below, we solve this by calculating the 
corrected standard errors based on Lechner’s approximation (Lechner, 2001). In Section 6.4, we return to this 
topic. 
21 Firms have been asked for employment levels in t and t-3 only. 
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Other important sources of selection are organizational complexity and 
internationalization (André et al., 2012; Bassemir, 2012). When a firm’s organizational 
structure becomes more complex, it is likely to influence its reporting strategy. Hence, we 
include a measure determining whether a firm is part of a group. Firms that use IFRS tend to 
be part of a larger network of subsidiaries (Bassemir, 2012). In addition, firms that belong to a 
group often create consolidated financial statements. By matching on group structure, we 
partially take into account differences in the propensity to use IFRS in consolidated and 
unconsolidated financial statements (André et al., 2012; Nobes, 2010). Furthermore, the parent 
company can force managers of subsidiaries to use IFRS, since the discretion that local GAAP 
provides in some jurisdictions could mask their performance from the parent company 
(Bassemir, 2012). The internal demand for higher informational transparency is likely to 
increase when firms have a large number of intragroup transactions. We, therefore, include the 
percentage of domestic sales to the parent company or affiliated subsidiaries as an additional 
matching criterion. 
In addition to organizational complexity, geographic dispersion of a firm’s operation 
can play a role in the demand for greater transparency (Bassemir, 2012). Multinational private 
firms have foreign suppliers and customers. Information asymmetries can increase with various 
foreign stakeholders because of cultural and legal diversity, different labor markets, multiple 
currencies, and language differences (Duru & Reeb, 2002). Hence, we include the percentage 
of foreign ownership, the percentage of goods imported, and the percentage of goods exported 
as matching criteria. 
Another potential source of self-selection into IFRS is firm performance. Well-
performing firms can disclose additional information to signal their superior performance 
(Allee & Yohn, 2009). We proxy for firm performance by calculating the firm’s productivity 
over the two-digit ISIC sector average at time t-3. If the obtained ratio is greater than 1, the firm 
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performs better than the average in terms of productivity.22 Additionally, we include growth as 
a matching criterion. We proxy for growth by using sales growth between t and t-3 to control 
for growth prospects. Firms with abundant growth opportunities are more likely to need external 
financing to fund additional projects (André et al., 2012; Bassemir, 2012).23 
Another matching criterion is the presence of a controlling owner or blockholder. A 
controlling owner in a private company is more likely to exploit creditors and minority 
shareholders by extracting private benefits of control. A controlling owner is less likely to 
voluntarily report information when shareholder structures are more dispersed (Hope, Thomas, 
& Vyas, 2011). 
Our next matching criterion is the proportion of internal funds. High-equity firms can 
be subject to a demand for increased disclosure by minority owners (Fan & Wong, 2002). In 
addition, a greater dependency on equity financing means lower leverage. Firms with more 
mature debt are likelier to increase their reporting transparency to improve the firm’s access to 
external finance (Kim et al., 2011). Internal funds and leverage are proxied by the proportion 
of a firm’s working capital financed from internal funds and retained earnings.24 
We also include a firm’s human capital as measured by the percentage of the workforce 
with a university degree, based on the intuitive sense that managers with a higher education 
understand the impact of reporting quality on capital providers’ risk perceptions (Bamber, 
Jiang, & Wang, 2010). 
Innovative firms that invest in R&D tend to face great uncertainty in terms of their 
project outcomes. These firms find it particularly difficult and costly to raise external funds 
                                                     
22 However, prior research fails to document a significant relation between profitability and voluntary adoption of 
IFRS by private firms (André et al., 2012; Bassemir, 2012). 
23 As an alternative proxy for performance, we use sales divided by the replacement value of the physical 
production assets. Results are presented in Section 6.4. 
24 As an additional check to control for past financing, we follow the same approach as Hope et al. (2011) by 
controlling for loan age, loan maturity, interest rate and collateral requirements. Results are discussed in Section 
6.4.  
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(Czarnitzki & Hottenrott, 2011). We control for innovative input by including a dummy 
variable, indicating whether a firm has invested in R&D, and another dummy variable, 
indicating whether a new product has been introduced within the last three years. 
Finally, a full set of country and industry dummies are included as matching criteria. In 
that way, we control for differences in a country’s legal and political systems, which have been 
shown to have direct and indirect effects on the accounting quality of firms (Soderstrom & Sun, 
2007). 
5. Results 
5.1. IFRS and Debt from Banks 
Our sample comprises 3,477 firms of which 420 firms use IFRS. The other 3,057 firms 
use only local GAAP. Firms in our sample are relatively small because our focus is confined to 
private firms. The average firm has 67 employees. 80 percent of the companies have less than 
50 employees and 6 percent have more than 250 employees. The average firm is approximately 
15 years old, and the largest owner owns, on average, 76 percent of the equity. 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on the unmatched and matched samples. First, we 
examine differences in the unmatched sample. We compare firms that use IFRS with the 
potential control group (i.e. all firms that rely exclusively on local GAAP). We provide p-values 
associated with two-sided t-tests of mean equality to compare differences in our matching 
criteria and outcome variables between the 420 treated firms that use IFRS and the 3,057 non-
treated firms. 25  We observe that almost all firm characteristics are significantly different 
between both groups, supporting the use of a large number of matching criteria. IFRS users are 
significantly larger, older and more productive – confirming a potential self-selection bias 
                                                     
25 For the sake of brevity, we only report descriptive statistics on the treated firms that are eventually matched 
following our protocol introduced in Section 4.1. Due to the common support restriction, three treated firms are 
eliminated from the sample. No statistical differences exist between the full set of the treated firms (420 IFRS 
firms) and the sample of treated firms where firms are excluded because of the common support restriction (417 
IFRS firms). 
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concerning better-performing firms that signal higher quality as a result of using IFRS. This 
implies that there are non-trivial direct costs involved in the use of IFRS, since larger firms 
seem to dominate the sample of IFRS users. We also see that firms using IFRS have less internal 
funds and more debt. Additionally, these firms are associated with greater investment in R&D 
and more innovative products, which can be seen as an indicator of future growth and debt 
increase. Firms that use IFRS tend to have a better educated workforce, leading to the prediction 
that more highly educated managers will be likelier to understand the impact of reporting 
quality on capital providers’ risk perceptions. Lastly, IFRS users export and import more, have 
a higher propensity to belong to a group, are more often owned by a foreign entity, and have 
more intragroup sales. The international focus associated with these firms renders them more 
inclined to disclose financial information based on IFRS. Besides these differences, there is no 
evidence that sales growth is significantly different between the two groups. Jointly considered, 
the descriptive statistics indicate important differences in firm characteristics between private 
firms that use IFRS voluntarily and those that rely exclusively on local GAAP. There is a strong 
positive correlation between IFRS usage and firm characteristics that drive the demand for 
transparent reporting. 
Regarding the outcome variables, the descriptive statistics indicate that firms using 
IFRS are associated with a significantly higher propensity to finance their fixed investments 
through domestic (33.1% vs. 24.1%) or foreign loans (9.6% vs. 2.3%) and are associated with 
the financing of a significantly higher percentage of their fixed investments through domestic 
(14.6% vs. 12.1%) and foreign loans (4.3% vs. 1.1%), respectively. This is consistent with Kim 
et al. (2011) who find a significant positive association between the use of IFRS and the ability 
of public firms to receive external finance. 
<<<<<Insert Table 3 about here>>>>> 
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We now turn to the propensity score matching results. First, we estimate a probit model 
to measure the propensity to engage in the voluntary production of statements based on IFRS. 
We regress our IFRS variable on all the matching criteria summarized in Table 2.26 We use the 
estimated propensity score to balance the samples, i.e. IFRS users are matched to a control 
group on a one-to-one basis, which maximally resembles the treated firms on all characteristics 
that influence the propensity to use IFRS. After restricting the sample to common support, only 
3 out of 420 treated firms drop out, i.e. we find broad support for the treatment group. 
Our results on the matched sample in Table 3 confirm that the matching procedure 
successfully balanced the samples of treated and untreated firms. No significant differences in 
firm characteristics remain after matching, mitigating self-selection into IFRS. 27  Any 
remaining differences in the dependent variables in question can be attributed to the use of 
IFRS, on the assumption that no unobserved covariates are systematically correlated with IFRS 
usage and access to bank finance.28 We calculate the estimated treatment effect by taking the 
difference in means between both groups. 
The matching procedure reveals that IFRS usage is associated with a significantly (p-
value < 0.1) higher propensity to receive debt from foreign banks in order to finance new fixed 
investments as well as a higher proportion of new fixed investments financed by foreign banks. 
While the absolute size of the differences appears to be small, the relatively higher magnitude 
associated with IFRS usage is substantial and economically meaningful. IFRS users have an 
81% higher chance of receiving a foreign loan (absolute change from 5.3% to 9.6%). Moreover, 
on average 4.33% of total new fixed investments by IFRS users are financed through foreign 
                                                     
26 The probit estimation (untabulated) shows a positive significant association between the decision to use IFRS 
and the variables: Group, Internal Sales, Foreign, Export, Human Capital, R&D and New Product. A significant 
negative association is found for the variable Blockholder. 
27 To further test our assumption that the treated group and the control group have a similar likelihood of adopting 
IFRS, we estimate a probit model on the newly matched sample (untabulated). None of the matching criteria have 
a significant impact on the likelihood of adopting IFRS.  
28 This assumption is further investigated in the robustness analyses using Rosenbaum bounds (Section 6.1). 
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loans, which is approximately twice the percentage employed by firms using only local GAAP. 
These findings are consistent with the notion that the use of IFRS enhances a firm’s 
transparency to foreign lenders and increases its comparability in the international loan market 
(Kim et al., 2011). Although statistically significant at a rather low level, they nevertheless 
indicate that the use of IFRS by private firms has a positive effect on access to foreign capital. 
After matching, we find that support for the descriptive finding that IFRS-using firms 
have a higher propensity to receive domestic loans is erased. The descriptive statistics in the 
unmatched sample seem, therefore, to be driven by self-selection effects. This finding is 
consistent with the notion that IFRS usage does not improve a firm’s transparency to domestic 
lenders. Typically, these lenders have access to various other private sources of information, 
which makes financial statements based on IFRS less useful. 
5.2. The Role of Enforcement 
While IFRS usage is associated with a greater chance of receiving bank debt in the full 
sample, the magnitude of the effect may actually vary with the strength of the local enforcement 
regime (Ball et al., 2015; Christensen, Hail, & Leuz, 2013; Florou & Kosi, 2015). 
On the one hand, stronger enforcement could mitigate the greater flexibility inherent in 
IFRS, which increases the usefulness of financial statement information for debt contracting. 
This could be particularly relevant for private firms since earnings management practices are 
frequently observed in private firms (Burgstahler et al., 2006). Low-regulatory enforcement 
reinforces the problem because it can be almost costless for firms to adopt IFRS merely in name 
(Ball, 2006). Furthermore, a lack of enforcement makes it more costly and difficult for investors 
to determine which IFRS adoptions are trustworthy. It follows that enforcement shapes firms' 
reporting incentives (Ball, Robin, and Wu, 2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler, Hail, 
and Leuz, 2006). Firms that operate in low-regulatory countries have less incentive to use IFRS 
because the signal of using IFRS is weaker compared to firms situated in countries with strong 
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enforcement. Therefore, we would expect to find a weaker association between IFRS usage and 
bank financing in countries with low regulatory quality.29 On the other hand, debt contracting 
terms can substitute for poor country-level enforcement mechanisms, rendering the 
enforcement regime irrelevant (Ball et al., 2015). 
In order to test this assumption empirically, we follow the literature (Ball et al., 2015; 
Christensen et al., 2013) and proxy IFRS enforcement strength per country with the regulatory 
quality index of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009).30 The index measures a country’s 
ability to implement regulatory and government policies that permit and promote private sector 
development. It is based on various dimensions of regulatory quality from 16 different data 
sources. The measure of enforcement strength ranges from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). We split 
our sample into countries that score above zero and those that score below zero.31 This produces 
14 countries in our sample with a strong enforcement regime, accounting for 2,216 firm-year 
observations, and 10 countries with a weak enforcement regime, accounting for 1,261 firm-year 
observations. Then, we employ the matching protocol introduced in Section 4.1 for both 
subsamples separately. Table 4 presents the results for countries with strong and low 
enforcement regimes. 
<<<<<Insert Table 4 about here>>>>> 
The matching procedure successfully balances the samples of treated and untreated 
firms for both subsamples. Considering countries with strong enforcement regimes, the results 
for the full sample that we presented previously become more pronounced in terms of statistical 
                                                     
29 Consistent with this explanation, Kim et al. (2011) show that listed firms that voluntarily adopt IFRS have a 
higher number of lenders, less restrictive covenants, and longer loan maturity in countries with strong legal 
enforcement regimes compared to voluntary adopters in low enforcement regimes. 
30 We use the most recent version (2015) of the index, which is publicly available at: http://www.govindicators.org. 
The updated version of the index incorporates revisions from previous years. Using older versions of the index, as 
with Ball et al. (2015) and Christensen et al. (2013), provide the same results qualitatively. Our results are 
comparable in terms of statistical significance and economic magnitude if we use the rule of law index of 
Kaufmann et al. (2008) instead of the regulatory quality index. Other proxies often used in the literature are only 
available for a small subset of countries covered in our study.  
31 Splitting at the median reveals the same results qualitatively. 
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significance as well as economic magnitude.32 Firms that operate under strong regimes and use 
IFRS are associated with an almost 9 times greater chance of securing access to foreign loans 
(absolute 11.8% vs. 1.4%, p-values < 0.001), which is compared with an almost 11 times larger 
percentage of foreign loans used to finance new fixed investments (absolute 4.78% vs. 0.46%, 
p-values < 0.001). The finding that IFRS users do not benefit from IFRS usage through 
enhanced prospects of securing access to domestic banks’ capital remains unchanged. 
Considering countries with a weak enforcement regime, the positive association 
between IFRS usage and access to foreign debt disappears. Consistent with our other results, 
no significant relationship between IFRS usage and access to debt from domestic banks is 
evident. 
Table 5 reports the average treatment effects for our outcome variables and tests for 
differences across and within high and low enforcement countries. It confirms that the 
differences in the average treatment effects between strong and weak enforcement regimes are 
significant. In particular, we find that the treatment effect is significantly greater for foreign 
loans in high enforcement countries compared to weak enforcement regimes. No significant 
differences are found with regard to domestic loan financing in high and low enforcement 
countries. 
Tests for differences within the subsamples also confirm that, in strong enforcement 
countries, the effect of IFRS usage is statistically greater for foreign loans compared to domestic 
loans, providing further support for the notion that IFRS is principally associated with non-
relationship lenders. Jointly considered, firms seem to be able to make a credible commitment 
to foreign lenders by voluntarily using IFRS, conditional on strong regulatory enforcement. 
                                                     
32 As an additional test, we run our analysis on an individual country level for 5 countries of each subsample that 
have the most firm observations. We find that all countries with strong enforcement have a positive association – 
albeit periodically insignificant (2 out of 5). When countries with weak enforcement are examined, we find an 
insignificant positive association in 4 out of 5 cases. Vietnam is the only negative association found but, with only 
3 IFRS users, this carries no significance. Given the sometimes low number of IFRS users per country, it is hardly 
surprising that the significance level drops. 
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<<<<<Insert Table 5 about here>>>>> 
These results are consistent with earlier findings, showing that private firms make 
significantly greater use of earnings management in countries with weak enforcement regimes 
(Burgstahler et al., 2006). Firms in these countries are less likely to improve their financial 
disclosure through IFRS usage. Moreover, if enforcement is weak, it may prove too costly for 
foreign banks to determine the extent to which firms can significantly improve their 
transparency and reliability (Ball, 2006). 
6. Robustness Tests and Limitations 
6.1. Selection Bias due to Unobservable Factors 
 One caveat in our empirical analyses resides in the conditional independence 
assumption, i.e. we are only able to control for potential selection biases caused by observable 
firm characteristics. Although we employ an extensive set of variables, the methods applied are 
not necessarily robust when measured against unobserved variables affecting both the treatment 
and outcome variables. To address this issue, we calculate Rosenbaum bounds that help to 
determine how strongly a potential unobserved variable would need to affect selection into 
treatment in order to undermine the results (Rosenbaum, 2002). 
 We calculate Mantel and Haenszel (1959) (MH) test statistics and associated p-values 
for the treatment effect, considering different levels of potentially hidden biases (Γ) . By 
comparing different levels of Γ, we can assess the strength of unobserved influences that would 
be necessary to render the estimated effects endogenously determined. It is important to note 
that the Rosenbaum bounds do not indicate whether biases exist or which magnitudes are 
plausible, but they allow us to assess the degree of concern we should have over unobserved 
factors that potentially alter the estimated relationship. 
 Table 6 presents the results following Rosenbaum’s (2002) approach of bounding the 
treatment effect estimates. The interpretation is straightforward. When there is no positive or 
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negative hidden bias (Γ = 1), no unobserved selection bias exists. In this case, the MH test 
statistics give a similar result to our main analyses, indicating a significant influence of IFRS 
usage on our outcome variable, access to foreign loans. By increasing Γ, we gradually augment 
the strength of the (potential) bias that was uncontrolled in our previous analyses. For both 
positive and negative biases, we calculate, respectively, the upper bounds and the lower bounds 
of the MH statistics to reveal the point at which our results become insignificant. The upper 
bound of the MH statistic (𝑄𝑄+(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)) adjusts the MH statistic downward for positive 
unobserved selection. In our context, a positive selection bias occurs if firms using IFRS have 
improved access to foreign debt even without using IFRS and with the same vector X as firms 
in the control group. The lower bound of the MH statistic (𝑄𝑄−(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)) measures the opposite. It 
adjusts the MH statistic downward for negative correlations with (unobserved) selection 
factors. Given that we have a positive estimated treatment effect, the bounds derived under the 
assumption that we would underestimate the true treatment effect are somewhat less interesting. 
This is because, if the effect is underestimated, the effect is significant under Γ = 1 and would 
increase in significance for increasing values of Γ. 
Table 4 indicates that IFRS usage is positively associated with debt that is attracted from 
foreign banks in countries with strong enforcement regimes. Table 6 shows that the critical 
point when our estimated effect of IFRS usage on ‘Access to Foreign Loans’ becomes 
insignificant is Γ = 4.55. This implies that firms with the same matching criteria should differ 
in their propensity to use IFRS due to unobserved factors by at least 355% before the results 
are undermined. These are conservative assessments since it is assumed that those unobserved 
differences perfectly determine the outcome variable. Otherwise, even larger differences would 
need to be present in order to modify our results. 
 Given the large critical Rosenbaum bounds and the large number of matching criteria 
employed, we are confident that any remaining unobserved variables that simultaneously affect 
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selection into IFRS usage and the ability to receive foreign loans will not alter the statistical 
significance of the estimated effects. 
<<<<<Insert Table 6 about here>>>>> 
6.2. Selection of Countries and Firms 
In a few countries, we observe a relatively large number of IFRS users, which raises the 
concern that either the sample is not representative in these countries or some special local 
regulations apply that lead to incomparable cases. For instance, 36.17% of firms from the 
Kyrgyz Republic indicate that they use IFRS (see Table 1). As all private firms in this country 
were required to implement IFRS by 2009, some firms could have anticipated the law change 
and adopted IFRS earlier. Armenia and Estonia have many IFRS-using firms (>20%), which 
may be due to the fact that their local GAAP is quite similar to IFRS.33 Therefore, we re-
estimated all previous models after we had removed all countries where more than 20% of firms 
indicate that they use IFRS. Table 7 presents our results. The previously presented results 
remain qualitatively the same.34 Furthermore, if the IFRS variable captures some firms using 
IFRS in a less meaningful way than others, our observed effect would actually be an 
underestimate. In this scenario, less meaningful use of IFRS should have a lesser effect on the 
propensity to receive foreign loans, or indeed have no effect at all.35 
<<<<<Insert Table 7 about here>>>>> 
6.3. Excluding Firms that do not need a Loan 
                                                     
33 Estonia was the first member of the European Union to commit to country-wide IFRS adoption. IFRS was 
adopted before any requirement to implement the EU Regulation, beginning in 1998 for all listed companies and 
in 2003 for all financial institutions. Estonia also made a commitment to permit IFRS in both consolidated financial 
statements and separate financial statements for all private firms. 
34 In our main analysis, 65% of IFRS-using firms indicate that they use IFRS in addition to local GAAP. The 
remaining percentage uses only IFRS. This number is partially driven by countries where firms are allowed to 
adopt IFRS for their statutory financial statements. However, in some countries where sole reliance on IFRS is 
prohibited, some firms still indicate use of only IFRS. This is, in principle, not possible. In alternative estimations, 
we therefore remove from the sample private firms that solely use IFRS, retaining only firms that use IFRS in 
addition to local GAAP. Again, all our results remained qualitatively unaltered. 
35 We also ran our analyses for Germany only, which accounts for 22.83% of our firm observations. We find 
similar effects to our main analyses in the high enforcement countries. Again, when we remove Germany from 
the sample, our results remain unchanged. 
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The descriptive statistics (Table 3) show that a substantial proportion of private firms 
used neither domestic nor foreign loans to finance new fixed investments. Some of the firms 
may not have required external debt. This could produce an overestimation of our effects if 
firms using IFRS have better growth opportunities and are, therefore, in greater need of debt 
financing. Although we already control for growth opportunities in our matching procedure, we 
chose to deploy an additional robustness check to exclude firms that indicate in the survey that 
a loan is not required.36 In order to test how this choice affects our main results, we examine 
whether IFRS users requiring finance still receive more financing from foreign sources. Table 
8 contains the results. Again, all our previously presented results remain unchanged. 
<<<<<Insert Table 8 about here>>>>> 
6.4. The Role of Auditing 
We ran analyses comparing firms that used audited financial statements with firms that 
did not carry out external audits. The auditors’ report explains which standards are followed 
(GAAP or IFRS) and provides assurance to debt providers that the firm’s implementation of 
IFRS is trustworthy. In addition, in the sample of firms with audited financial statements, it 
should be of less concern that some firms that have only applied IFRS selectively should remain 
undetected (Nobes, 2010). Consistent with prior research (Hope et al., 2011), Table 9 shows 
that our main results are largely driven by firms with audited financial statements.37 In the 
subsample of firms without audited financial statements, we find no significant differences 
between firms that use IFRS and firms that solely use local GAAP. This suggests that IFRS 
standards are particularly useful if their usage is backed by credible commitment. 
<<<<<Insert Table 9 about here>>>>> 
                                                     
36 Other reasons include: interest rates are too high, collateral requirements for bank loans are too strict, application 
procedures for a bank loan are too burdensome, informal payments to get a bank loan are required, and belief on 
the part of the manager that the loan deal would not be approved. 
37 As an additional test, we calculate the Rosenbaum bounds for the subsample of firms with audited financial 
statements in countries with high enforcement. For this subsample, we find a critical point of Γ = 2.10. 
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6.4. Additional Robustness Checks 
Table 10 presents several additional tests that serve to validate our results. First, we 
check if different treatment effects exist between countries that allowed IFRS for statutory 
purposes compared to countries where such usage was not permitted. Panel A of Table 10 
demonstrates that this difference is negligible. Another potential concern is that IFRS users 
receive better access to foreign debt but the conditions underpinning receipt of those additional 
funds differ for firms that solely use local GAAP. Therefore, in a subsequent step, we 
considered a subset of firms for which more detailed data on the most recent loan a firm received 
is available. We know the interest rate for each loan, the collateral requirements, the duration 
of the loan in months, and the time period when the loan was received. Panel B of Table 10 
shows descriptively that firms operating in high enforcement countries have lower interest rates, 
less collateral requirements, and longer loan maturity compared to firms operating in low 
enforcement countries. However, no statistically significant differences exist between IFRS and 
local GAAP users with regard to these additional outcome variables in both high and low 
enforcement countries. Unfortunately, the detailed data on loan characteristics does not 
differentiate between loans received from domestic banks and from foreign banks. We are, 
therefore, unable to establish whether the characteristics of foreign loans are different from 
those of domestic loans. 
To test the sensitivity of our analyses with regard to leverage, we re-run all estimations 
including the interest rate, collateral requirements, loan maturity, and the period of time when 
the loan was received as additional matching criteria. As an alternative proxy for performance, 
we use sales minus costs of goods sold divided by the replacement value of the physical 
production assets. Although the sample size reduces considerably due to data availability, Panel 
C shows that our results remain robust to these additional controls. 
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Finally, we perform an alternative matching procedure. We use a caliper matching 
method without replacement following Cochran and Rubin (1973). This method is similar to 
the nearest neighbor matching method described in Section 4.1, but it adds an additional 
restriction in selecting only controls within a certain distance. Firms are then matched to closer 
(more comparable) control firms. The downside to this approach is that a lower number of 
matched firms is often the outcome. Our results for a 0.10 caliper cutoff proved to be robust 
and are presented in Panel D.38 
<<<<<Insert Table 10 about here>>>>> 
6.5. Remaining Limitations 
Before drawing our conclusions, we think it is worthwhile to discuss some limitations 
present in our study. First, the BEEPS survey is focused on factors affecting the operations and 
growth of private firms but not their financial reporting strategies. This limits the precision of 
the IFRS variable. For instance, we cannot rule out the possibility that some firms that claim to 
use IFRS have merely sought guidance on a very limited number of IFRS standards to inform 
specific aspects of their financial reporting. In short, some IFRS users may have been selective 
in applying only a few IFRS standards. This is less of a concern, however, in the subsample of 
countries where enforcement is high or in firms with an audited financial statement. The 
auditors’ report explains which standards are followed (GAAP or IFRS), ruling out any chance 
of using IFRS selectively to mislead debt providers. For the group of audited firms, the use of 
IFRS is more likely to encompass full IFRS adoption (Nobes, 2010). Since our results hold 
when restricting the sample to audited firms, the potential for heterogeneous use of IFRS may 
not be a major caveat. 
In addition, the national rules of some countries under consideration did not allow 
private firms to adopt IFRS for consolidated or unconsolidated accounts at the time they were 
                                                     
38 Statistically, the same results are obtained for the cut-off points of 0.05 and 0.15. 
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observed. However, firms still used IFRS through either dual reporting or reconsolidation 
(World Bank, 2015a). As previously stated, we are unable to detect these different types of 
IFRS user in the sample. Some firms may have indicated that they use IFRS yet used these 
standards solely to construct non-statutory financial statements. It is not clear if these statements 
are subject to enforcement and/or external audit. While this might pose a major caveat, 
comparing countries that either permitted or did not permit IFRS adoption reveals very similar 
results. In any case, if the IFRS variable captures some firms that selectively use IFRS amid 
others that fully adopt IFRS, our estimated effects would likely be downward biased. 
 A third issue concerns the notion that IFRS usage could be driven by private firms’ 
incentives to increase their reporting quality rather than by IFRS itself (Christensen et al., 2015; 
Daske et al., 2013). These managerial incentives are correlated with IFRS usage and could 
therefore act as drivers of the documented associations. Moreover, the use of IFRS could be 
demanded by specific lenders or business partners, and potentially be confounded by firms that 
apply for loans. In this case, the use of IFRS may be correlated with the degree to which a firm 
is exposed to specific financial institutions or businesses. Rosenbaum bounds suggest that the 
control variables included in the matching exercise capture most of the unobserved variation. 
However, in the absence of specific information on external demand factors, we need to 
recognize that our results may well be overestimated. In this respect, the unavailability of panel 
data precludes us from using alternative estimation methods, such as a conditional difference-
in-difference estimator or a regression discontinuity design that would improve identification. 
Our approach can only control for observable sources of selection or sources of endogeneity 
that are strongly correlated with those observables. While we control for the most relevant 
criteria identified in the literature, which is confirmed by Rosenbaum bound analyses, a 
cautious interpretation is nonetheless warranted. 
7. Conclusion 
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This study provides evidence of how IFRS usage is related to private firms’ ability to 
attract debt from domestic and foreign banks. Based on comparable firm-level data from 25 
countries in Europe and Asia, we show that private firms using IFRS are associated with a 
higher propensity to attract loans from foreign banks in order to finance new fixed investments. 
No such association is found for loans provided by domestic banks. The evidence suggests that 
firms voluntarily using IFRS are associated with an improvement in accounting quality 
(Christensen et al., 2015), allowing non-relationship lenders to better assess a firm’s 
creditworthiness. International banks are known to use ‘hard’ information such as financial 
statements to determine a borrower’s credit quality because ‘soft’ information is not available 
or is too costly to process (Beck & Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Berger & Udell, 2006). Domestic 
banks in the countries under consideration often use various private channels of information, 
which accounts for the missing evidence that the use of IFRS improves private firms’ propensity 
to attract debt from domestic capital providers. It should be noted that descriptive statistics 
support a positive association between IFRS usage and domestic bank financing but that this 
positive association disappears once we control for various well-documented sources of self-
selection into IFRS usage. 
As it currently stands, mainly large and internationally active private firms use IFRS 
voluntarily. A large proportion of private firms do not voluntarily opt for IFRS, most likely 
because the individual costs outweigh the benefits of using these standards. Our results indicate 
that, conditional on adequate enforcement, the benefits of IFRS usage come from higher 
propensities to attract debt from foreign banks. How large these benefits actually are and 
whether these benefits outweigh the costs of IFRS adoption must be answered for each firm 
individually. The present study has focused on firms that are perceived to have strong incentives 
to use IFRS (i.e. voluntary IFRS users). Whether the results hold for firms with weaker 
incentives will need to be determined by future research.  
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The documented associations may also differ for firms that fully adopt IFRS (i.e. its full 
application in financial statements) compared to firms that make only selective use of some 
standards (see e.g., Daske et al. (2013) and Christensen et al. (2015) for a discussion on 
‘heterogeneous IFRS adopters’). Once richer datasets for private firms become available, future 
research will be positioned to investigate how the costs and benefits vary with the differences 
in IFRS implementation. Future research could add valuable new insights by unraveling the 
exact mechanisms through which the use of IFRS by private firms influences their ability to 
attract foreign debt. We argue that those mechanisms are a combination of the provision of 
higher quality information concerning a firm’s financial situation and enhanced firm 
comparability. As the latter is probably more important for foreign non-relationship lenders, 
further insights could be added by examining differences between domestic relationship lenders 
and domestic non-relationship lenders. Finally, altering the perspective to consider how IFRS 
accounting actually assists financial institutions in assessing a firm’s creditworthiness would 
help a great deal to advance our understanding.  
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Table 1. Sample Distribution, Regulatory Quality, and Effective Date of IFRS adoption 
Country Observations in Sample 
Percentage of 
IFRS Users 
Regulatory Quality 
2003 (index) 
Adoption of IFRS 
(Effective date) 
Country Specific Rules for Non-Listed Firms on The Adoption of IFRS 
in Consolidated (C) and in Unconsolidated (U) Annual Accounts 
Albania 76 11.84% -0.469 2008 C + U is required for large entities 
Armenia 182 36.26% 0.175 2011 C + U is required for all entities, except micro entities 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 12 16.67% -0.479 2006 C + U is required for all entities 
Czech Republic 99 7.07% 1.184 2002 C is permitted for all entities; U permitted for members of a group which use IFRS to prepare C 
Estonia 39 84.62% 1.318 2003 C + U is permitted for all entities 
Germany 794 10.33% 1.511 2004 U is permitted for all entities, but for information purpose only; from 2003 onwards, C is allowed 
Greece 154 7.14% 0.998 2004 C + U is permitted for entities which are audited by certified auditors 
Hungary 189 12.70% 1.118 2005 C is permitted for all entities; U is permitted, in addition to required national GAAP 
Kazakhstan 145 6.90% -0.476 2006 C + U is required for public interest entities 
Kyrgyz Republic 47 36.17% -0.409 2009 C + U is required for all entities 
Latvia 37 21.62% 0.956 2005 C is permitted for all entities 
Lithuania 66 21.21% 1.039 2008 C + U is permitted for all entities 
Macedonia 40 17.50% -0.187 2010 C + U is required for all entities 
Moldova 57 12.28% -0.472 2011 C + U is permitted for all entities 
Poland 353 4.25% 0.717 2005 C + U is permitted for entities that have applied for public listing or whose parent uses IFRS 
Portugal 88 12.50% 1.226 2006 C is permitted for all entities. U is permitted for members of a group which use IFRS to prepare C 
Romania 199 21.61% -0.072 2007 C+ U is permitted for all entities, but for information purpose only 
Russia 130 3.08% -0.183 2012 C is required for entities who are obliged by federal laws or constitutive documents 
Slovak Republic 19 5.26% 0.956 2006 C + U is required for public interest entities 
Slovenia 65 13.85% 0.867 2005 C + U is permitted for all entities 
South Korea 45 22.22% 0.749 2011 C + U is permitted for all entities 
Tajikistan 56 3.57% -1.12 2007 C + U is required for all entities 
Turkey 86 9.30% 0.031 2008 C is required for public interest entities, C is permitted for others 
Ukraine 140 12.14% -0.562 2011 C + U is permitted for all entities 
Vietnam 359 0.84% -0.559 NA prohibited for all entities 
Total 3,477 12.08% 0.314    
Note: We use data from the third wave of the BEEPS survey, which was carried out between the last quarter of 2004 and the first quarter of 2005 by the EBRD and World Bank. The sample consists of 3,477 firm 
observations where 12.08% of firms use IFRS. For each country, we present (i) the total number of observations, (ii) the percentage of IFRS users, (iii) the Regulatory Quality index taken from Kaufmann et al. (2009) 
and measured as of 2003, (iv) the year when private firms are effectively allowed/required to adopt IFRS as the method for financial reporting, (v) and a description that indicates the type of private firm that is allowed 
or required to adopt IFRS from the effective date onwards. If the description does not state that an entity is required or permitted to adopt IFRS, these entities are prohibited from adopting IFRS for official purposes. 
C stands for the adoption of IFRS in consolidated financial statements and U for the adoption of IFRS in unconsolidated financial statements. These requirements exclude financial entities, investment funds, insurance 
companies, private pension funds, and entities whose shares are traded on the stock exchange (ROSC from the World Bank, ifrs.org, IAS+, and PWC). 
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Table 2. Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Variable Description 
Panel A: Treatment Indicator 
IFRS Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm uses International Financial Reporting Standards. It 
equals 0 if the firm solely used local GAAP. The question included in the survey was: “Does 
your firm use international accounting standards (IAS) as provided by the International 
Accounting Standards Board or US GAAP or national accounting standards as provided by the 
Ministry of Finance or securities regulator?” Firms could answer Yes or No on each of the three 
standards. 
Panel B: Outcome Variables 
Access to Domestic Loans Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm borrowed from domestic banks to finance new fixed 
investments over the last 12 months, 0 otherwise. 
Domestic Loans (%) The proportion of new fixed investments that are financed by domestic loans over the last 12 
months. 
Access to Foreign Loans Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm borrowed from foreign banks to finance new fixed 
investments over the last 12 months, 0 otherwise. 
Foreign Loans (%) The proportion of new fixed investments that are financed by foreign loans over the last 12 
months. 
Panel C: Matching Criteria 
Employees Number of Employees in t-3. 
Age Age of the firm. 
Group Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is part of a group, 0 otherwise. 
Internal Sales Proportion of the firm’s sales to the parent company or affiliated subsidiaries. 
Foreign Proportion of the firm that is owned by a private foreign individual or foreign company. 
Import Proportion of the firm’s material inputs and supplies that are imported. 
Export Proportion of the firm’s sales that are exported. 
Blockholder Proportion of shares that is owned by the largest shareholder(s). 
Productivity Productivity measured by sales in t-3 divided by employees in t-3 and then scaled by the average 
productivity in t-3 of the same industry in a given country. 
Sales growth Growth of sales over the last three years. 
Internal funds Proportion of a firm's working capital that is financed by internal funds and retained earnings. 
Human capital Proportion of employees with a university degree. 
R&D Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm was engaged in Research & Development, 0 otherwise. 
New product Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm introduced a new product within the last three years, 
0 otherwise: 
Panel D: Additional Variables 
Regulatory Quality We proxy for enforcement quality of countries by using the regulatory quality measure of 
Kaufmann et al. (2009). The estimated regulatory quality score ranges from approximately 2.5 
(strong) to -2.5 (weak). We classify countries above zero as strong enforcement regimes; 
countries that score below 0 are classified as weak enforcement regimes.  
Auditor Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has its financial statements checked and certified by an 
external auditor, 0 otherwise. 
Performance Sales minus cost of goods sold divided by the replacement value of the physical production 
assets owned and used by your firm (land, buildings, and equipment). 
Loan interest The annual costs of the most recently obtained bank loan (i.e. rate of interest). 
Collateral required Dummy variable equal to 1 if the most recent loan requires collateral, 0 otherwise. 
Loan maturity The duration of the loan in months. 
Time Loan Received Number of years since the loan was received. 
Note: Table 2 presents the definitions of the variables that we use in the analyses. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Matching Results 
 Unmatched Sample Matched Sample 
  IFRS Firms N: 417  
Local GAAP Firms 
N: 3,057  
Test for 
Differences  
Local GAAP Firms 
N: 417  
Test for 
Differences 
Variables  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  p-value  Mean Std. Dev.  p-value 
Matching Criteria 
Employees  143.504 332.963  55.938 201.541  p < 0.001  169.463 405.548  p = 0.462 
Age  18.516 19.674  14.551 14.596  p < 0.001  20.794 24.428  p = 0.281 
Group  0.257 0.437  0.082 0.274  p < 0.001  0.261 0.44  p = 0.905 
Internal Sales   6.376 18.844  1.521 9.737  p < 0.001  5.086 17.28  p = 0.426 
Foreign   19.137 34.623  5.864 21.749  p < 0.001  19.305 36.557  p = 0.959 
Import   39.434 37.871  23.561 33.999  p < 0.001  35.427 37.106  p = 0.240 
Export   17.803 28.051  6.055 17.742  p < 0.001  18.228 28.964  p = 0.871 
Blockholder   69.369 29.165  77.045 27.947  p < 0.001  72.046 28.861  p = 0.311 
Productivity  1.089 0.808  0.995 1.084  p = 0.029  1.004 0.953  p = 0.306 
Sales growth  0.13 0.308  0.111 0.345  p = 0.252  0.136 0.405  p = 0.858 
Internal funds   60.544 36.71  64.922 37.678  p = 0.025  58.688 36.519  p = 0.578 
Human capital   23.379 24.436  18.992 24.706  p < 0.001  24.141 26.705  p = 0.749 
R&D  0.348 0.477  0.127 0.333  p < 0.001  0.365 0.482  p = 0.702 
New product  0.494 0.501  0.296 0.457  p < 0.001  0.487 0.5  p = 0.875 
Outcome Variables 
Access to Domestic Loans   0.331 0.471  0.241 0.428  p < 0.001  0.309 0.463  p = 0.611 
Domestic Loans (%)  14.612 25.675  12.118 26.214  p = 0.074  13.597 25.846  p = 0.667 
Access to Foreign Loans   0.096 0.295  0.023 0.149  p < 0.001  0.053 0.224  p = 0.055 
Foreign Loans (%)  4.329 16.718  1.107 8.825  p < 0.001  2.23 11.831  p = 0.087 
Note: Table 3 presents the results for the unmatched and matched samples. The matched sample is obtained using propensity score matching. In the unmatched sample, we report p-values of 
two-sided t-tests on mean equality between firms that use IFRS and firms from the potential control group (i.e. all firms that only use local GAAP). In the matched sample, we report p-values 
of two-sided t-tests on mean equality between firms that use IFRS and a selected control group of firms following the matching procedure described in Section 4.1. Thirteen industry dummies 
and twenty-five country dummies are not reported. The selected controls are selected from the same country as the matched pair. The matched sample is also balanced over industries after 
matching. The reported p-values for the matched sample account for sampling with replacement (Lechner, 2001). Three firms drop out to satisfy the common support restriction. See Table 2 
for variable definitions. 
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Table 4. Matching Results: High vs Low Enforcement 
 Countries with High Enforcement  Countries with Low Enforcement 
 
 
IFRS Firms 
N: 296  
Local GAAP Firms 
N: 296  
Test for 
Differences  
IFRS Firms 
N: 121  
Local GAAP Firms 
N: 121  
Test for 
Differences 
Variables Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  p-value  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  p-value 
Matching Criteria 
Employees 156.929 368.637  145.115 308.74  p = 0.759  110.661 220.741  107.884 354.359  p = 0.952 
Age 19.517 20.78  18.53 19.869  p = 0.679  16.066 16.485  15.579 15.685  p = 0.837 
Group 0.28 0.45  0.291 0.455  p = 0.851  0.198 0.4  0.149 0.357  p = 0.370 
Internal Sales  7.057 19.536  6.145 18.759  p = 0.685  4.711 16.996  4.603 17.81  p = 0.967 
Foreign  19.378 34.287  18.375 36.534  p = 0.814  18.545 35.57  19.694 36.771  p = 0.831 
Import  38.909 36.39  35.716 37.261  p = 0.467  40.719 41.401  46.017 42.06  p = 0.391 
Export  18.622 27.266  16.122 28.718  p = 0.457  15.802 29.908  12.529 28.178  p = 0.443 
Blockholder  67.128 28.795  62.564 28.576  p = 0.179  74.851 29.458  79.678 26.516  p = 0.238 
Productivity 1.115 0.828  0.993 0.845  p = 0.222  1.025 0.756  0.896 0.991  p = 0.337 
Sales growth 0.094 0.222  0.089 0.324  p = 0.904  0.219 0.443  0.197 0.414  p = 0.730 
Internal funds  55.814 36.182  53.328 35.846  p = 0.559  72.116 35.545  75.942 35.621  p = 0.467 
Human capital  21.912 23.642  23.554 26.386  p = 0.591  26.967 26.03  28.372 26.371  p = 0.717 
R&D 0.385 0.487  0.351 0.478  p = 0.553  0.256 0.438  0.223 0.418  p = 0.600 
New product 0.497 0.501  0.473 0.5  p = 0.690  0.488 0.502  0.496 0.502  p = 0.911 
Outcome Variables 
Access to Domestic Loans  0.385 0.487  0.399 0.49  p = 0.816  0.198 0.4  0.231 0.423  p = 0.590 
Domestic Loans (%) 16.899 26.411  20.294 29.588  p = 0.321  9.017 22.935  11.339 25.721  p = 0.525 
Access to Foreign Loans  0.118 0.323  0.014 0.116  p < 0.001  0.041 0.2  0.033 0.18  p = 0.766 
Foreign Loans (%) 4.78 16.551  0.456 4.858  p < 0.001  3.223 17.137  2.727 15.811  p = 0.837 
Note: Table 4 presents the results for the matched subsamples of high enforcement and low enforcement countries. The matched samples are obtained using propensity score matching. Countries 
are placed in the high (low) enforcement subsample if the regulatory quality index of Kaufmann et al. (2009) is higher (lower) than zero. We report p-values of two-sided t-tests on mean equality 
between firms that use IFRS and the selected control group of firms following the matching procedure described in Section 4.1. The selected controls are chosen from the same country as the 
matched pair. Both subsamples are balanced over industries after matching. The reported p-values for the matched sample account for sampling with replacement (Lechner, 2001). All firms 
satisfy the common support restriction in the subsample of countries with low enforcement. Three firms drop out to satisfy the common support restriction in the subsample of countries with 
high enforcement. See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
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Table 5. Summary of Treatment Effects and Tests for Differences Between Groups 
 
Countries 
with High 
Enforcement 
 
Countries 
with Low 
Enforcement 
 
Tests for Differences: 
High vs Low 
Enforcement 
  N: 296  N: 121  
Treatment Effect high enf. = 
Treatment Effect low enf.   
Outcome Variables 
Average 
Treatment 
Effect 
 
Average 
Treatment 
Effect 
 
Access to Domestic Loans  -0.014  -0.033  p = 0.788 
Domestic Loans (%) -3.395  -2.322  p = 0.801 
Access to Foreign Loans  0.105***  0.008  p = 0.005 
Foreign Loans (%) 4.324***  0.496  p = 0.061 
Tests for differences: 
Domestic vs Foreign Loans 
     
Treatment Effect Access to domestic Loans  
= Treatment Effect Access to foreign Loans p = 0.008  p = 0.517   
Treatment Effect Domestic Loans (%)  
= Treatment Effect Foreign Loans (%) p = 0.003  p = 0.513   
Note: Table 5 summarizes the average treatment effect of IFRS usage for the subsamples of high and low enforcement 
countries. The treatment effects are equal to the difference in the average of the outcome variable of the treated firms and 
the non-treated firms found in Table 4. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The 
column that presents the tests for differences between high and low enforcement countries reports p-values of two-sided 
unpaired t-tests on mean equality between the treatment effects found in the high and low enforcement sample. The row that 
presents the tests for differences between domestic and foreign loans reports p-values of two-sided t-tests on mean equality 
between the treatment effects found for foreign and domestic loans. See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
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Table 6. Rosenbaum Bounds – Unobserved Factors on Access to Foreign Loans 
Γ 𝑄𝑄+(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) 𝑄𝑄−(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) p-value 
1 4.96615 4.96615 p < 0.001 
…    
4.25 1.4005 10.7973 p = 0.0807 
4.30 1.3762 10.8604 p = 0.0844 
4.35 1.3523 10.9232 p = 0.0881 
4.40 1.3286 10.9856 p = 0.0920 
4.45 1.3052 11.0475 p = 0.0959 
4.50 1.2822 11.1091 p = 0.0999 
4.55 1.2594 11.1704 p = 0.1039 
4.60 1.2369 11.2313 p = 0.1081 
4.65 1.2147 11.2918 p = 0.1122 
4.70 1.1927 11.3520 p = 0.1165 
4.75 1.1710 11.4118 p = 0.1208 
…    
Note: Table 6 reports Rosenbaum bounds for the treatment effect of IFRS usage on ‘Access to Foreign Loans’ for the 
subsample of high enforcement countries. The Rosenbaum bounds give an indication of when our results would become 
insignificant if we faced a certain level of positive or negative unobserved selection bias. When no (unobserved) bias 
exist (Γ = 1), the Mantel-Haenszel test-statistic of Q+(MH) = Q−(MH) = 4.96615 confirms that there is a significant impact 
of IFRS usage on ‘Access to Foreign Loans’. Column 1 shows the odds (Γ) of selection bias due to unobserved factors, which 
we gradually increase. Column 2 and Column 3 display the Mantel-Haenszel test statistic with the assumption of over-
estimation Q+(MH)  and under-estimation Q−(MH) of the treatment effect, respectively. In Column 4, we translate the 
Mantel-Haenszel test statistic with the assumption of over-estimation to the associated p-values. P-values for under-
estimation are not reported. In the case of an underestimation of the treatment effect, the effect is significant under Γ = 1 and 
becomes even more significant for increasing values of Γ. The critical gamma appears in bold. P-values lower than 0.10 
indicate that the outcome variables are insensitive to unobserved selection biases. The critical Γ is 3.7 at the 5% significance 
level, and 2.8 at the 1% level. See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
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Table 7. Excluding Countries with a High Percentage of IFRS Users 
Panel A: All Countries 
 
IFRS Firms Local GAAP Firms  
N: 227 N: 227  
Outcome Variables Mean Mean p-value 
Access to Domestic Loans 0.302 0.378 p = 0.148 
Domestic Loans (%) 13.253 17.271 p = 0.176 
Access to Foreign Loans 0.111 0.036 p = 0.004 
Foreign Loans (%) 4.844 1.244 p = 0.008 
Panel B: High vs Low Enforcement Countries 
 
High Enforcement Countries  Low Enforcement Countries 
IFRS Firms Local GAAP Firms   IFRS Firms 
Local GAAP 
Firms  
N: 166 N: 166   N: 61 N: 61  
Outcome Variables Mean Mean p-value  Mean Mean p-value 
Access to Domestic Loans 0.337 0.398 p = 0.342  0.213 0.164 p = 0.540 
Domestic Loans (%) 15.072 17.681 p = 0.462  9.016 8.934 p = 0.987 
Access to Foreign Loans 0.127 0.042 p = 0.012  0.066 0.098 p = 0.572 
Foreign Loans (%) 4.819 1.265 p = 0.013  4.754 7.541 p = 0.554 
Note: Panel A of Table 7 reports results for the matched sample when we exclude countries where more than 20% of firms 
indicate that they use IFRS. In Panel B, we split the sample in countries with high and low enforcement. Countries are placed 
in the high (low) enforcement subsample if the regulatory quality index of Kaufmann et al. (2009) is higher (lower) than zero. 
The matched samples are obtained using propensity score matching. For each subsample, we present means and p-values of 
two-sided t-tests on mean equality between firms that use IFRS and firms that solely use local GAAP (after matching). The p-
values reported account for sampling with replacement (Lechner, 2001). The same matching criteria are used as those presented 
in Table 3. The matching criteria do not significantly differ after matching (untabulated). The controls are selected from the 
same country as the matched pair. In all subsamples, the matched samples are balanced over industries after matching. In the 
samples used in Panel A, Panel B (HIGH ENF), and Panel B (LOW ENF) respectively, 2, 2, and 0 firms drop out of the sample 
to satisfy the common support restriction. See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
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Table 8. Excluding Firms that do not need a Loan 
Panel A: All Countries 
 
IFRS Firms Local GAAP Firms p-value 
N: 321 N: 321  
Outcome Variables Mean Mean  
Access to Domestic Loans 0.421 0.492 p = 0.163 
Domestic Loans (%) 18.592 23.146 p = 0.134 
Access to Foreign Loans 0.115 0.050 p = 0.012 
Foreign Loans (%) 4.969 1.963 p = 0.025 
Panel B: High vs Low Enforcement Countries 
 
High Enforcement Countries  Low Enforcement Countries 
IFRS Firms Local GAAP Firms   IFRS Firms 
Local GAAP 
Firms  
N: 226 N: 226   N: 95 N: 95  
Outcome Variables Mean Mean p-value  Mean Mean p-value 
Access to Domestic Loans 0.491 0.509 p = 0.786  0.253 0.253 p = 1.000 
Domestic Loans (%) 21.580 23.589 p = 0.495  11.484 12.842 p = 0.753 
Access to Foreign Loans 0.142 0.031 p < 0.001  0.053 0.053 p = 1.000 
Foreign Loans (%) 5.332 1.261 p = 0.006  4.105 4.211 p = 0.973 
Note: Panel A of Table 8 report results for the matched sample when we exclude firms that indicate that they do not need a 
loan. For Panel B, we split the sample into countries with high and low enforcement. Countries are in the high (low) enforcement 
subsample if the regulatory quality index of Kaufmann et al. (2009) is higher (lower) than zero. The matched samples are 
obtained using propensity score matching as introduced in Section 4.1. For each subsample, we present means and p-values of 
two-sided t-tests on mean equality between firms that use IFRS and firms that solely use local GAAP (after matching). The p-
values reported account for sampling with replacement (Lechner, 2001). The same matching criteria are used as those presented 
in Table 3. The matching criteria do not significantly differ after matching (untabulated). The controls are selected from the 
same country as the matched pair. In all subsamples, the matched samples are balanced over industries after matching. All firms 
satisfy the common support restriction. See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
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Table 9. Firms with and without an External Auditor 
Panel A: Firms with an External Auditor (All Countries) 
 
IFRS Firms Local GAAP Firms 
 
N: 258 N: 258 
Outcome Variables Mean Mean p-values 
Access to Domestic Loans 0.360 0.388 p = 0.606 
Domestic Loans (%) 15.391 17.965 p = 0.386 
Access to Foreign Loans 0.105 0.043 p = 0.018 
Foreign Loans (%) 4.109 1.628 p = 0.056 
Panel B: Firms with an External Auditor (High vs Low Enforcement Countries) 
 
High Enforcement Countries  Low Enforcement Countries 
IFRS Firms Local GAAP Firms   IFRS Firms 
Local GAAP 
Firms  
N: 192 N: 192   N: 71 N: 71  
Outcome Variables Mean Mean p-value  Mean Mean p-value 
Access to Domestic Loans 0.396 0.406 p = 0.870  0.211 0.155 p = 0.744 
Domestic Loans (%) 16.380 16.938 p = 0.868  11.070 9.310 p = 0.471 
Access to Foreign Loans 0.120 0.031 p = 0.003  0.042 0.113 p = 0.228 
Foreign Loans (%) 4.479 0.573 p = 0.001  2.958 8.028 p = 0.271 
Panel C: Firms without an External Auditor (All Countries) 
 
IFRS Firms Local GAAP Firms 
 
N: 106 N: 106 
Outcome Variables Mean Mean p-values 
Access to Domestic Loans 0.245 0.311 p = 0.321 
Domestic Loans (%) 11.557 13.368 p = 0.612 
Access to Foreign Loans 0.066 0.047 p = 0.577 
Foreign Loans (%) 3.774 1.887 p = 0.349 
Panel D: Firms without an External Auditor (High vs Low Enforcement Countries) 
 
High Enforcement Countries  Low Enforcement Countries 
IFRS Firms Local GAAP Firms   IFRS Firms 
Local GAAP 
Firms  
N: 56 N: 56   N: 48 N: 48  
Outcome Variables Mean Mean p-value  Mean Mean p-value 
Access to Domestic Loans 0.286 0.340 p = 0.558  0.167 0.125 p = 0.586 
Domestic Loans (%) 15.536 14.375 p = 0.819  6.146 5.313 p = 0.816 
Access to Foreign Loans 0.089 0.036 p = 0.253  0.042 0.021 p = 0.577 
Foreign Loans (%) 3.929 1.071 p = 0.200  3.75 1.042 p = 0.348 
Note: In Panel A and Panel C of Table 9, we report results for the matched subsample of firms with or without audited financial 
statements. In Panel B and Panel D, we split these samples into countries with high and low enforcement. Countries are placed 
in the high (low) enforcement subsample if the regulatory quality index of Kaufmann et al. (2009) is higher (lower) than zero. 
The matched samples are obtained using propensity score matching as introduced in Section 4.1. For each subsample, we 
present means and p-values of two-sided t-tests on mean equality between firms that use IFRS and firms that solely use local 
GAAP (after matching). The p-values reported account for sampling with replacement (Lechner, 2001). The same matching 
criteria as those presented in Table 3 are used. The matching criteria do not significantly differ after matching (untabulated). 
The controls are selected from the same country as a matched pair. In all subsamples, the matched samples are balanced over 
industries. A caliper matching with a cut-off value of 0.10 is used in the subsample of Panel A and Panel B (HIGH ENF). Our 
matching criteria are still significantly different in these samples without including the additional caliper restriction. In the 
samples used in Panel A, Panel B (HIGH ENF), Panel B (LOW ENF), Panel C, Panel D (HIGH ENF) and Panel D (LOW ENF) 
respectively, 55, 49, 1, 1, 1 and 2 firms drop out to satisfy the common support restriction or caliper restriction. See Table 2 for 
variable definitions. 
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Table 10. Additional Robustness Checks 
Panel A: Countries that Allowed Adoption vs Countries that Did Not Allow Adoption 
 
High Enforcement, Allowed  High enforcement, Not Allowed 
IFRS Firms Local GAAP Firms   IFRS Firms 
Local GAAP 
Firms  
N: 186 N: 186   N:108 N: 108  
Outcome Variables Mean Mean p-value  Mean Mean p-value 
Access to Domestic Loans 0.339 0.398 p = 0.403  0.463 0.435 p = 0.741 
Domestic Loans (%) 16.059 19.806 p = 0.387  18.472 23.472 p = 0.321 
Access to Foreign Loans 0.118 0.022 p = 0.007  0.120 0.046 p = 0.084 
Foreign Loans (%) 4.839 0.914 p = 0.013  4.768 0.648 p = 0.011 
Panel B: Additional Outcome Variables 
 
High Enforcement Countries  Low Enforcement Countries 
IFRS Firms Local GAAP Firms   IFRS Firms 
Local GAAP 
Firms  
N: 119 N: 119   N:62 N: 62  
Additional  
Outcome Variables Mean Mean p-value  Mean Mean p-value 
Loan Interest 9.782 9.968 p = 0.760  16.408 17.581 p = 0.309 
Collateral Required 0.798 0.874 p = 0.115  0.887 0.952 p = 0.188 
Loan Maturity 43.983 42.580 p = 0.752  34.129 26.903 p = 0.289 
Time Loan Received 3.303 3.059 p = 0.542  1.355 1.274 p = 0.715 
Outcome Variables Mean Mean p-value  Mean Mean p-value 
Access to Domestic Loans 0.571 0.630 p = 0.355  0.371 0.339 p = 0.709 
Domestic Loans (%) 26.134 28.092 p = 0.611  16.952 18.790 p = 0.743 
Access to Foreign Loans 0.168 0.076 p = 0.028  0.081 0.081 p = 0.880 
Foreign Loans (%) 6.008 1.765 p = 0.014  6.290 6.935 p = 1.000 
Panel C: Including Additional Controls 
 
High Enforcement Countries  Low Enforcement Countries 
IFRS Firms Local GAAP Firms   IFRS Firms 
Local GAAP 
Firms  
N: 165 N: 165   N:43 N: 43  
Outcome Variables Mean Mean p-value  Mean Mean p-value 
Access to Domestic Loans 0.588 0.582 p = 0.911  0.302 0.442 p = 0.181 
Domestic Loans (%) 25.406 25.006 p = 0.847  14.326 22.884 p = 0.202 
Access to Foreign Loans 0.188 0.066 p < 0.001  0.116 0.093 p = 0.728 
Foreign Loans (%) 6.636 1.697 p < 0.001  9.070 8.837 p = 0.969 
Panel D: Caliper Matching Results without Replacement with Cut-off Point 0.10 
 
High Enforcement Countries  Low Enforcement Countries 
IFRS Firms Local GAAP Firms   IFRS Firms 
Local GAAP 
Firms  
N: 218 N: 218   N: 109 N: 109  
Outcome Variables Mean Mean p-value  Mean Mean p-value 
Access to Domestic Loans 0.381 0.431 p = 0.284  0.211 0.174 p = 0.494 
Domestic Loans (%) 16.789 20.307 p = 0.180  9.826 8.826 p = 0.756 
Access to Foreign Loans 0.106 0.037 p = 0.005  0.037 0.046 p = 0.735 
Foreign Loans (%) 4.404 1.353 p = 0.016  2.661 3.211 p = 0.801 
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Note: Table 10 reports our results for the matched sample of various robustness checks. In Panel A, we report results on the 
subsample of countries with high enforcement that either allowed or did not allow IFRS adoption for private firms. Panel B 
reports results on the matched sample including additional outcome variables: Loan Interest, Collateral Required, Loan 
Maturity, and Time Loan Received. Panel C reports results on the matched sample when we include additional matching 
criteria: Performance, Loan Interest, Collateral Required, Loan Maturity, and Time Loan Received. Panel D reports results on 
the matched sample when we use a different matching protocol: caliper matching without replacement with a cut-off point of 
0.10. For each panel, we report the means and p-values of two-sided t-tests on mean equality for firms that use IFRS and firms 
that solely use local GAAP (after matching). The p-values reported account for sampling with replacement, except in Panel D 
where we match without replacement (Lechner, 2001). The same matching criteria are used as those presented in Table 3. The 
matching criteria do not significantly differ after matching (untabulated). The controls are selected from the same country as 
the matched pair. In all subsamples, the matched samples are balanced over industries after matching. A caliper matching with 
a cut off 0.05 was used in the subsample of panel B (HIGH ENF). Our matching criteria are still significantly different in this 
sample without including the additional caliper restriction In the samples used in Panel A (ALLOWED), Panel A (NOT 
ALLOWED), Panel B (HIGH ENF), Panel B (LOW ENF), Panel C (HIGH ENF), Panel C (LOW ENF), Panel D (HIGH ENF) 
and Panel D (LOW ENF) respectively, 3, 2, 74, 0, 7, 2, 81 and 12 firms drop out the sample to satisfy the common support 
restriction or additional caliper restriction. See Table 2 for variable definitions. 
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